For determinism, something in the past ‘determines’ the responses of the present, but for Sartrean existentialism, nothing in the past forces a response to a given situation in the present, because each of us chooses what the situation means, and we are never faced with only one possible choice, although we are responsible for the consequences of that choice.
Contrary to what determinism holds, the past cannot influence our present, but we must establish the meaning that this past has in our present. If we were born with a shorter leg, we would be the ones who would decide what meaning this (our bodily condition) would have for us when skiing. This condition, eventually, could prevent us from becoming great skiers, but the meaning of this situation is determined by us.
Sartre argued that most of us choose something from our past and project it into our future. The individual who intends to learn to ski but ultimately abandons the endeavor, argues that he may not enjoy skiing due to his lack of aptitude for sports or age limitations. Sartre referred to this as acting in bad faith.
Moving on, if we are advised not to ski after an accident, but we would like to, we are free to decide not to ski anymore. When we listen to others talk about skiing or watch photographs or films of skiers, we see how quickly our decision tends to fade away. From the Sartrean perspective, it is not that the past compels us to engage in skiing; rather, we confront a rupture with our past, encompassing the decision we made to discontinue skiing and the skier’s self we were when we achieved it. A nothingness has arisen between us and our past, and we experience it with anguish.
We have anguish not only about the past but also about the future, and it is even more intense because we must build our future skiing. The anguish commences when we realize that we are not yet the skiers we are going to be, together with the fear of not reaching that place or of not even wanting to be there. Nothing guarantees that the decisions we make now, our future skier’s self will fulfill them. Our good faith, our existential courage, is the recognition that this is true and the willingness to subscribe to that future despite the anguish.
We have just mentioned that bad faith is a Sartrean notion that is based on our tendency to repeat past skiing as a kind of ‘betrayal’ towards ourselves, or “a lie with which one deceives oneself about oneself”, knowing that we have the freedom to choose to transcend and achieve the virtuous skiing we desire.
An example of bad faith can be seen when we say, “I couldn’t help it” or “I couldn’t do anything”, but let’s keep in mind that there are alternatives, and that we can always do something else. Bad faith is “denying our own transcendence by appealing to our own facticity.” For example, we might say, “I cannot ski better because I am not an athletic person” (facticity), and thus express our refusal to become a better skier (transcendence).
Acting in bad faith is a characteristic of the inauthentic skier. According to Sartre, we act in bad faith when we take refuge in excuses for our actions, for deceiving or misrepresenting our own responsibility. However, we also find existential danger in bad faith when an athlete is pressured by his coach to compete in a certain discipline, denying his freedom of choice.
