Ethics and morality are branches of practical philosophy that facilitate our understanding of conduct—not as a manifestation of being, but as the ought-to-be in relation to good and evil. Often misunderstood and used interchangeably, ethics pertains to individual agency, whereas morality focuses on collective procedures and norms.
Ethical-moral behavior distinguishes itself by recognizing the normative ought; in contrast, other behaviors simply represent the descriptive is. Insofar as the ought exists, we apply morality to all our free acts as the autonomous authors of them. Aristotelian philosophy, which postulates eudaimonia (flourishing or happiness) as the telos (ultimate end), implies a notion of ethical duty. We would not act ethically out of mere obligation, but because we derive pleasure, joy, or complacency from having acted rightly.
Continuing this inquiry, ethics and morality are fundamental dimensions of human existence. However, it is essential to discern between the positive and negative aspects of our conduct while skiing. According to Sartre, ethical anguish arises when we reflect on whether our actions are beneficial or deleterious, and subsequently decide whether to commit to them or abstain. From earliest childhood, we have inhabited these concepts of good and bad; we cannot evade this predicament while skiing. On the contrary, we are summoned to reflect upon it.
Within our domain, the primordial question is: how should we comport ourselves on a ski resort? Does each individual act solely according to personal preference? We must exhibit ethical and moral conduct while skiing, as morality is a shared responsibility exercised in the presence of others—for it is the Other who perceives and validates our presence. The problem arises with the nihilistic skier, for whom nothing is transcendent and nothing is binding.
According to the Concept of Shared Space (Alterity), a ski resort is not a mere physical void or a neutral terrain for the exercise of will, but rather an intersubjective space where the presence of the Other imposes an ethical limit to our absolute freedom. As Levinas suggests, the ‘face’ of the other skier calls us to a responsibility that precedes any formal rule.
Following this reasoning, we cannot selectively choose the situations for which we are responsible. Ethics presupposes that moral acts emanate from the will and exist in proximity to ignorance. If we are capable of employing the necessary measures, we bear the responsibility of maintaining control over our skiing. But if we lack that capacity, does our responsibility vanish?
Ethics distinguishes between a twofold ignorance: vincible (culpable) and invincible (non-culpable) ignorance. The former is the lack of necessary knowledge in a given field—such as a novice skier who ventures onto certain slopes without the required technical skills, which they could have acquired. Here, we refer to negligence or the “will to ignore.”
True ethical skiing requires more than technical proficiency; it demands phronesis—the practical wisdom to discern whether our skill is commensurate with the inherent risks of the terrain. Ignorance becomes culpable when we fail to exercise this faculty of judgment before committing to a slope that exceeds our mastery.
The second type concerns knowledge we do not possess because we could not have obtained it. Such is the case of a beginner skier who collides with another in a designated beginner’s area: they lacked the technical proficiency to avoid the impact; thus, there is no negligence.
From the perspective of consequentialist ethics, determining whether an action is beneficial or harmful depends on its outcomes. If we abruptly change our trajectory in a congested area, endangering those nearby, consequentialism deems it an appropriate action if someone suddenly falls in front of us and we must perform said maneuver to avoid a collision.
In the context of paternalistic ethics, it is the responsibility of the ski instructor, as an authority, to determine what is best for the learner, regardless of his immediate beliefs. A consequentialist judgment holds the instructor accountable if the outcomes are negative due to an inappropriate action. The same applies to paternalism when actions do not result in the learner’s benefit and lack a plausible justification.
It is not the instructor’s responsibility to guarantee “success” with their learners—though that is desirable—but rather to proceed in a manner that is appropriate, reasonable, and objective. According to the ethics of care, the ski instructor has an ethical obligation to safeguard those under their charge. It is more significant to provide learners with what they require than to grant them what they desire.
Ultimately, ethical skiing transcends mere rule-following; it becomes an ‘aesthetic of existence.‘ In this sense, the fluid harmony of a well-executed turn is not just a physical feat, but a reflection of the moral integrity of the practitioner, who acts in balance with themselves, the community, and the mountain.
