It seems that our instincts drive us to do things we should not do because our moral law prohibits them. For example, we might attempt to ski outside a delimited area of the mountain, even though it is normatively forbidden.
The moral law is the law of Sollen (the “ought to be”), and in practicing it, we must fulfill a duty. However, our postmodern disposition dictates the opposite—that is, the absence of any duty. If we allow ourselves to be guided by our egoistic condition, it will drag us toward an irrepressible “wanting” through impulses and desires. But how can we overcome this vortex?
Although our natural tendency is to follow our impulses to overpower the “other,” we can free ourselves through the “ought to be.” In most situations, it is the morally virtuous skiers who tend to feel “overwhelmed” by the immorality of others.
Let us understand that Kantian ethics does not establish what is right or wrong; rather, right and wrong are determined by categorical and hypothetical imperatives. Categorical imperatives are a type of universal mandate that guides our actions according to unconditional requirements through verbal periphrasis: “must,” “have to,” and “ought.” In the categorical imperative, we must take the correct action regardless of the consequences.
For example, we must always respect others on the mountain, act with responsibility when skiing, and assist those in need. According to this imperative, we act without expecting any reward; whereas, under the hypothetical or conditional imperative, we do so because we expect to receive something in return—that is, we act under a circumstantial condition.
We mentioned earlier that the ethical realm extends between what is and what ought to be, and the first imperative is to become what we ought to be. If we are to become ethical skiers, it is because we are currently not what we should be; in that lack, in that deficiency, a contradiction arises: we are, but we are not what we ought to be.
If our goal is to learn to ski, the hypothetical imperative requires us to take the necessary steps, such as hiring an instructor. However, Kantian ethical philosophy proposes that we must treat others as an end in themselves, not as a means to achieve a result or take advantage of something.
The problem that arises is: does a learner consider their instructor as a means to an end—namely, becoming a competent skier? Kant doesn’t forbid using people as a means, but he forbids using them merely (only) as a means. As long as the learner respects the instructor’s autonomy and professional dignity, they are following the moral law.
Kant does not prohibit professional services wherein an individual serves as a ‘means’ to an end. The ethical validity of this exchange lies in the instructor’s informed consent to participate. By paying for a lesson, the skier is not “using” the instructor as a mere object; rather, they are engaging in a contractual agreement between two rational and free agents. This allows the learner to utilize the instructor’s expertise, provided they do not degrade the instructor to a mere “skiing tool” or an instrument of their own will.
In moral symmetry, the instructor could also err by viewing the student merely as a means—specifically, as a source of income. Kantian ethics on the mountain demands that both parties recognize each other’s intrinsic dignity, transcending the purely commercial or transactional nature of the contract.
One could argue that an ethical community of skiers shouldn’t be merely a group following a set of rules, but rather a “Kingdom of Ends”. In this space, every individual should respect the autonomy of others, transforming the mountain into a realm of rational freedom rather than one governed solely by physical impulses.
Kant’s proposition is that being free is not doing what we want, but knowing how to choose between wanting, desiring, and duty. In the context of the mountain, we must distinguish between negative liberty and positive liberty.
- Negative liberty is understood as “freedom from”—the absence of external obstacles or constraints. A skier might seek this liberty by ignoring signs and boundaries, viewing rules as mere interference with their personal impulses. However, for Kant, this is not true freedom, but rather a form of heteronomy, where the individual is a slave to their own shifting desires.
- In contrast, positive liberty is “freedom to”—specifically, the freedom to govern oneself through reason. This is autonomy: the capacity to act according to a law that we, as rational beings, give to ourselves (the moral law). Therefore, the ethical skier who follows safety regulations out of duty is not “less free”; rather, they are exercising their positive liberty by choosing the “Ought” over mere instinct, transforming a physical act into a supreme exercise of rational agency.
To conclude these reflections, we could take into consideration that one method for determining ethical conduct is to ask ourselves if others would undertake the same action as we do—that is, if it is desirable for everyone. If the answer is affirmative, then we have acted ethically.
