Experience and thought constitute essential sources of skiing knowledge. Immanuel Kant incorporated the following terms into the thought of knowledge: a priori, which comes from reason and is independent of experience; and a posteriori, derived from experience. Apriorism signifies “before experience,” or “that which is given prior to facts or to experience.”
In order for knowledge regarding skiing to emerge, it is imperative that we utilize our capabilities to engage in experience, comprehend things, and then relate with them either through decomposition or association. Examples of aprioristic determinations could include: the snow can be slippery, the snow melts in warm temperatures, not all skiers are beginners, or not all athletes succeed in competitions.
According to Kant, a priori refers to the systematic arrangement of sensible data within one’s mind. These ‘ordering patterns’ are prior to all sensible knowledge; therefore, we would not be knowing how skiing is in itself, but the result of the sensible data grasped and the a priori categories that order those data. We do not have access to sensible knowledge as it is presented to us, but as a result of having passed through our mental filters.
Understanding skiing is, in fact, our capacity to think about objects and relate them. The dimensions of comprehension pertain to time and space, which are attributes of our intellect and not of the external world. According to Kant, we experience skiing as a process in time and space, which are the two forms of sensibility prior to experience, they are a priori.
The ability to perceive time and space intuitively is an inherent quality. It is possible to perceive our skiing as extensive, in the form of space, or as successive, i.e., cyclical movements, turns, or descents in the form of time. Because these forms are a priori, we know that before we experience something, we will grasp it as a phenomenon in time and space.
According to Kant, while we may not share identical sensible experiences, we do share common mechanisms for apprehending them. This is referred to as the phenomenon, which denotes the skiing reality that is presented to us or what is there. What we know is not skiing itself, but rather the phenomenon, which is the reality for us.
Moreover, Kant posited that all that we observe is adapted to the ‘molds’ of our sensibility to be represented in a way, i.e., the forms of understanding. Representations of objects, such as learning to ski, must conform to the molds we have in our minds in order to be thought, analyzed, and reflected upon. We are not a tabula rasa, a blank slate that receives sensations from outside, but rather an entity that actively molds them. Kant regards these molds as categories of understanding.
These categories, also known as pure concepts, correspond to diverse types of assessments we make. For example, in the category of totality, we can say that all snow is white (universal judgment). In that of plurality, some ski resorts do not make economic profits (plural judgment). In terms of unity, John skis well (singular judgment). In that of reality or essence, that our skis are red (affirmative judgment). In the realm of negation, that no snowflake is capable of reproducing itself (negative judgment). In terms of limitation, carbon is a non-metal (infinite judgment). In terms of substance, Mike is a ski instructor (categorical judgment). In the realm of causation, if a ski has two tips it is a twin tip ski (hypothetical judgment). The categories of quantity help us organize what we receive through the senses: one slope or several slopes. The categories of relationships entail cause-and-effect relationships that link to distinct actions, such as an instructor’s satisfaction upon seeing a novice skier successfully descend his first slope without falling.
By way of summary, we point out that, according to the Kantian perspective, we have two main matrices which are time and space, but that they are not the only ones. For skiing knowledge to be produced, that is, to know skiing, we need broader structures that allow us to indicate that “the snow is white,” “the mogul is convex,” or that “our ideal trajectory is curvilinear”, and those structures are the “categories” that allow us to know by means of concepts. The “a priori” forms such as time, space, and categories do not come from experience, but from structures consubstantial to our minds.
